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WHAT DEFINES "BUSINESS NECESSITY" IN THE
DISCRIMINATION CONTEXT?
A Federal Appellate Case Grapples With How Fast
Transit Police Officers Must Run
By JOANNA GROSSMAN
lawjlg@hofstra.edu


Tuesday, Nov. 19, 2002
How fast should an applicant be able to run 1.5 miles if she wants to be a transit police officer in Philadelphia? That
is the question at the heart of a recent opinion by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of Lanning v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority (SEPTA).
The plaintiffs are five unsuccessful female applicants, who, according to SEPTA, could not run fast enough to
become transit officers. They have sued under Title VII, the main federal antidiscrimination statute. In their
complaint, the five women allege that the transit authority's fitness requirements constitute "disparate impact
discrimination"  that is, they discriminate against women candidates because they result in very few women
being hired as officers.
Lanning also provides a cautionary tale about the way in which an appropriate legal standard  here, the standard
for disparate impact discrimination  can be undermined if courts misapply it.
How the Running Test Was Devised
The test the women are challenging was developed by an exercise physiologist, Dr. Paul Davis. In 1991, SEPTA
hired Dr. Davis to develop a fitness test for its police officers.
To do so, Dr. Davis accompanied existing transit officers on the job for two days to gain an understanding of their
daytoday job tasks. He also conducted a study with twenty experienced officers to determine what physical
abilities and what level of fitness were required for adequate performance of their jobs. He concluded that
applicants must run, jog, and walk on the job.
The officers in the study suggested that an applicant should be able to run a mile in 11.78 minutes, while wearing
full gear. But Dr. Davis rejected that standard as too low, based on his assessment that any individual could do
that. He also considered heightening the standard to force applicants to demonstrate an aerobic capacity of 50
mL/kg/min, but he dismissed that option because of the "draconian effect" it would have on women.
Finally, Dr. Davis decided that something in between would be just right, and recommended that SEPTA insist on
an aerobic capacity of 42.5 mL/kg/min. To prove they had this capacity, applicants would have to run 1.5 miles in
12 minutes.
That was the standard ultimately adopted by SEPTA. Transit officers rarely if ever have to actually run 1.5 miles on
the job. However, the test was used as a proxy for measuring the aerobic capacity Dr. Davis felt the applicants
would need to perform actual job functions successfully.
It turned out that only a very small percentage of female applicants, between 6 and 12 percent, could pass this
test. In contrast, a majority of male applicants could. That difference resulted in a hiring pattern that significantly
favored men over women.
Disparate Impact Analysis: What the Supreme Court Requires
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Then, in 1991, Congress amended the statute to expressly recognize that Title VII prohibits disparate impact
discrimination. According to the amended statute, disparate impact analysis involves a threestep inquiry by the
court.
First, the court asks, Has the plaintiffemployee made out her prima facie (that is, threshold) case, by showing
that the application of a facially neutral standard has resulted in a discriminatory hiring pattern? If so, the court
asks, Has the employer, who now bears the burden, proven that the particular standard or practice is justified by
"business necessity"?
That leads to another important question, though: What constitutes "business necessity"? After Griggs, an
increasingly conservative Supreme Court weakened the standard so that almost any job requirement could be
justified as a business necessity.
But then, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress overruled the Supreme Court and went back to the initial,
stringent standard, under which "necessity" truly means necessity  not, say, convenience. After that, appellate
courts had to reinterpret the standard consistent with Congress' direction.
If the employer has not borne its burden to show "business necessity," the plaintiff wins. If it has, the court goes
on to yet another question: Has the plaintiff proved that the employer rejected an alternative employment
practice that would both have a less disparate impact and satisfy its legitimate business interest? If so, the plaintiff
still wins.
Disparate impact litigation revolves around experts. Each side typically calls its own expert: the plaintiff's expert is
used to make the initial statistical showing of disparate impact, and the employer's expert is used to validate the
practicethat is, to show that it is indeed necessary.
Experts are particularly central to cases that, like Lanning, involve a strength or fitness requirement. In such case,
they must analyze the nature of a particular job and then translate it into concrete fitness requirements: For
instance, how many pushups should a firefighter be able to do in order to show her ability to carry out her job
functions?
The First Appellate Decision: Lanning I Interprets "Business Necessity"
The Lanning case actually went to the appeals court twice  first in 1999, and then this year, as discussed above.
capacity; the question was, how much?
As a result, the first appellate decision, Lanning I revolved only around the following question: Did SEPTA prove
that the fitness requirement was "consistent with business necessity"?
Answering the question was complicated by the fact that Lanning I was the case in which the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit first responded to the 1991 Civil Rights Act's command to reinterpret  and heighten 
the "business necessity" standard.
Thus, the Third Circuit there considered two possible interpretations of "business necessity."
SEPTA argued for what was roughly a "more is better" standard: Transit officers need to be able to apprehend
perpetrators and make arrests, and better fitness levels will make them better at those jobs. More fitness is always
better, so a demanding test is necessary.
But under this approach, an employer could set a standard so high that virtually all women would be excluded.
Surely that could not be right.
The appellate court concluded instead that businesses must prove that the standard enforces a "minimum
qualification necessary for successful performance of the job in question." The court was particularly concerned
about "excessive cutoff scores that have a disparate impact on minorities." If the employee could perform the job's
requirements, the court decided, "business necessity" could not be used to justify further qualifications.
The court thus remanded the case to the district court with instructions to determine, among other things,
whether having the particular aerobic capacity Dr. Davis's standard required (42.5 mL/kg/min) was a "minimum
qualification." Could someone with a lesser aerobic capacity successfully perform the tasks required of a transit
officer? If so, the fitness requirement would be invalid.
On remand, the district court made new factual findings. But it reached the same conclusion it had reached the
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/grossman/20021119.html
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first time: the fitness requirement was consistent with business necessity. The plaintiffs then appealed to the
Third Circuit again leading to the 2002 decision I discussed at the start of the column, which I will call Lanning II.
Lanning II: Misapplying the Standard and Thwarting Congress's Intent
Although the panel paid lip service (as it had to) to the earlier panel's articulation of the legal standard, it did little
to see that the standard had been implemented correctly by the lower court.
With only a cursory review of the evidence, the majority upheld the district court's conclusion that applicants who
fail the fitness test would be much less likely to "successfully execute critical policing tasks."
Shooting fish in a barrel, the dissenting judge pointed out the myriad flaws in the evidence put forth by SEPTA to
defend its fitness requirement as a "minimum" qualification. (SEPTA's own expert, Dr. Davis, admitted he had
used "intellectual creativity" to come up with the requirement, suggesting it was hardly written in stone.)
If the appellate court had looked at the evidence more carefully, it would have been obvious that  as the
dissenting judge concluded  the fitness requirement was no minimum qualification. Several points make this very
clear.
Why It's Clear the Fitness Requirement Was Not A Minimum Qualification
First, the fitness requirement was not used to disqualify existing transit officers, many of whom could not satisfy
it. Incumbent officers were given incentives to meet the goal. Yet there were no consequences for failing.
Obviously  unless SEPTA viewed all those who failed as unqualified  the test was not in fact a "minimum
qualification" necessary for performance of the job. Indeed, many officers who failed did their jobs nonetheless.
(One female officer who had failed the fitness test, but been hired by mistake, was even repeatedly commended
for her work.)
Second, the fitness test is given only upon application, not upon beginning work two, or twoandahalf years
later. Fitness at the time of application is certainly not a job qualification, even if fitness as an officer might be
(though not at this level).
Evidence in the record suggests that, with moderate training over the interim period, a significantly greater
number of female applicants could meet the standard by the time they begin work. But SEPTA did not offer this
training, or even give the applicants an opportunity to improve their running times on their own and then be re
tested.
In sum, if SEPTA truly believed the fitness test were a minimum job qualification, it would administer it just before
employees started, and periodically thereafter, and fire everyone, incumbent or not, who failed. It did not.
Third, while the "1.5 miles in 12 minutes" standard SEPTA settled on may not sound harsh to runners, it is
stricter than the standard imposed by many branches of the U.S. military, the FBI, and the New York City transit
authority. It is not clear why being a transit officer in Philadelphia would be so much more demanding than these
other positions.
Fourth, the studies used to defend the necessity of the fitness requirement were vulnerable to serious criticism.
For example, one study purported to measure the speed of an "average perpetrator" as a basis for determining
how fast officers would need to run to apprehend them. That's fine in theory, but in practice, as the dissent
pointed out, the average perpetrator's speed was measured based on a group of individuals, 2/3 of whom were
high school or college track starsand thus probably much, much more fit than the average turnstile jumper in
Philly.
The Lessons of Lanning
The Lanning case is important on a number of levels. First, it is distressing because it allows SEPTA to employ a
standard that will result in significantly fewer women being hired for the job of transit police officer  perpetuating
the unfortunate reality that most law enforcement jobs are held by men. And it does so for no good reason: This
standard is not really a minimum qualification for the job, and female officers (as one has shown) can succeed well
without meeting it
The Lanning case also tells a cautionary tale about the limited power of law to change culture. Here, the first
appellate panel  in Lanning I  established a strict legal standard designed to eliminate discriminatory hiring
practices, and to ensure that greater numbers of women were given the opportunity to obtain the job of transit
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/grossman/20021119.html
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officer. Yet the district court repeated its initial conclusion despite the new, stricter standard, and then  in Lanning
II  the next appellate panel rubberstamped the district court's decision.
The solution to hiring practices that create discriminatory gender patterns may thus have to come from outside
the legal system.
Joanna Grossman, a FindLaw columnist, is an associate professor of law at Hofstra University, where she teaches Sex Discrimination Law,
among other subjects. Grossman's other articles on sex discrimination may be found in the archive of her pieces on this site. As part of her
research for this column, Grossman ran 1.5 miles in 11 and a half minutes.
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